

UNCLASSIFIED

PTQ9064

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ9064

PAGE 01 STATE 323818 060046Z  
 ORIGIN IO-16

|      |         |         |         |         |        |         |         |
|------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|
| INFO | LOG-00  | AF-01   | AID-01  | AMAD-01 | ARA-01 | CIAE-00 | SMEC-00 |
|      | CFE-00  | OASY-00 | DOEE-00 | ANHR-01 | EAP-01 | EUR-01  | OIGO-01 |
|      | H-01    | INM-02  | TEDE-00 | INR-00  | L-01   | ADS-00  | MED-07  |
|      | M-00    | NEA-01  | NSAE-00 | NSCE-00 | OIC-02 | OIG-04  | OMB-01  |
|      | PA-01   | PM-00   | PRS-01  | P-01    | SB-00  | SNP-00  | SP-00   |
|      | SR-00   | SSO-00  | SS-00   | TRSE-00 | T-00   | USIE-00 | SA-01   |
|      | SNIS-00 | NISC-01 | PMB-00  | PRME-01 | DRL-09 | G-00    | /058R   |

DRAFTED BY: IO/PHO:RLOFTIS-GSTETTENBAUER;PM/ISP:PSUTER

APPROVED BY: IO:GFWARD

|                |                  |                 |                |
|----------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| EUR/NE:MLEKSON | T:AWINNER        | PRM/AAA:ANELSON | AF/C:RFENDRICK |
| PM/ISP:DLAYTON | G:AJOYCE         | EUR/NB:CGREEN   | SA/INS:DLAWTON |
| P:EBRIMMER     | USUN/W:DSCHEFFER | SA/PAB:CWEBSTER | S/S-O:WFDAVNIE |
| NSC:ADSENS     | OSD:COL.BERAUD   | JCS:GEN.CROSS   | S/S:CBARR      |

NEA/MAG:EVAZQUEZ

EUR/CAN:FBURTON

EAP/ANZ:LMCCALL

EUR/CE:TEVANS

INM/ICJ:RPERITO

IO/UNP:GSTANTON

EUR/CE:GTHEILMANN

AID/AFR/CCWA:LLLOYD

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:

IO, PM, PRM, AF, SA, EUR, NEA, USUN/W, P, G, INM, T, AID

-----8F7633 060049Z /38

O R 060041Z DEC 94

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 323818 060046Z  
 AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER  
 DATE/CASE ID: 04 NOV 2011 201005065

UNCLASSIFIED

AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC 0000  
CJCS WASHDC 0000  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
AMEMBASSY DAKAR  
AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE  
AMEMBASSY KIEV

UNCLASSIFIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 323818

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, UN, MARR, MOPS, UNSC, RW

SUBJECT: RWANDA/ZAIRE: RECRUITING TROOPS FOR CAMP  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 323818 060046Z  
SECURITY

REF: USUN NEW YORK 5088 (NOTAL)

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPH 10.

2. (C) SUMMARY: UN SECRETARY GENERAL (SYG) BOUTROS-GHALI  
REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF RWANDAN  
REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE, RECOMMENDING THAT THREE TO FIVE  
THOUSAND ADDITIONAL TROOPS BE DEPLOYED TO THE REGION TO

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURE THE CAMPS AND FACILITATE THE REPATRIATION OF  
REFUGEES WISHING TO RETURN TO RWANDA. IN RESPONSE, THE UN  
SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTED THE SYG TO EXPLORE ALL POSSIBLE  
MEANS TO RESOLVE THE GROWING PROBLEMS IN THE CAMPS,  
INCLUDING HIS OWN RECOMMENDED OPTION. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS  
THAT POSTS ASCERTAIN THE LEVEL OF HOST COUNTRY WILLINGNESS  
TO DEPLOY TROOPS - SEPARATE FROM OR IN ADDITION TO ANY  
ALREADY COMMITTED TO UNAMIR - TO IMPLEMENT THE SYG'S  
PLAN. END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

3. (C) OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS IT HAS BECOME

INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT A COMBINATION OF EX-FAR AND  
MILITIA ELEMENTS IN AND AROUND THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS  
IN ZAIRE ARE INTIMIDATING AND HARASSING HUNDREDS OF  
THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES, PREVENTING THOSE WHO WISH TO RETURN  
TO RWANDA FROM DOING SO. MANY REFUGEES HAVE BEEN KILLED.  
IN ADDITION, IT IS CLEAR THAT THESE ELEMENTS ARE  
CONTROLLING THE DISTRIBUTION OF VIRTUALLY ALL RELIEF  
SUPPLIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 323818 060046Z

4. (C) AT LEAST ONE NGO (MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES/FRANCE)  
HAS SHUT DOWN OPERATIONS IN THE CAMPS FOR SECURITY  
REASONS. SOME FIFTEEN OTHER NGO'S HAVE THREATENED TO STOP  
SERVICING THE CAMPS, NOT ONLY FOR SECURITY REASONS, BUT  
MORE IMPORTANTLY BECAUSE THEY ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE  
MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF SUPPORTING THOSE WHO ARE BELIEVED TO  
BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING GENOCIDE EARLIER THIS YEAR.  
MANY BELIEVE THAT THESE - PRIMARILY EX-FAR AND HUTU  
MILITIA - FORCES ARE USING INTERNATIONAL LARGESSE TO BUILD  
THEMSELVES UP FOR A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES, POSSIBLY  
INCLUDING AN INVASION OF RWANDA.

5. (U) SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS-GHALI'S NOVEMBER 18  
REPORT ON SECURITY IN THE RWANDA REFUGEE CAMPS OFFERS  
THREE OPTIONS: A) DEPLOYMENT OF A NEW PEACEKEEPING FORCE  
TO THE CAMPS TO PROTECT HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND  
PROVIDE SAFE PASSAGE TO THE RWANDAN BORDER FOR THOSE  
REFUGEES WHO WISH TO RETURN HOME; B) CREATION OF A UN  
FORCE, ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER, TO

UNCLASSIFIED

REMOVE THE EX-FAR, HUTU MILITIA AND LEADERSHIP FROM THE REFUGEE CAMPS; C) AUTHORIZATION OF A SINGLE MEMBER-STATE OR COALITION TO UNDERTAKE THESE TASKS. THE REPORT REITERATES THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EARLIER RECOMMENDATION THAT "THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF ENSURING THE SAFETY OF THE REFUGEES AND THEIR FREEDOM TO RETURN TO RWANDA WOULD BE THE SEPARATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS, FORMER RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) AND MILITIA FROM THE REST OF THE POPULATION."

UNCLASSIFIED

6. (U) GIVEN THE UNLIKELYHOOD THAT THE UN CAN FIND THE TROOPS FOR A CHAPTER VII OPERATION OR THAT A COALITION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 323818 060046Z

WILL VOLUNTEER, THE SYG RECOMMENDS OPTION (A). THE SYG ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT, AS AN IMMEDIATE STEP, ASSISTANCE BE PROVIDED TO ZAIRIAN SECURITY FORCES TO PROTECT HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS (THE UNHCR POLICE SERVICES PACKAGE) AND TO THE GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI TO ENABLE IT TO FUNCTION.

7. (U) OPTION (A) IS SIMILAR TO THE U.S. "BUBBLE" CONCEPT, WHICH WOULD CONSIST OF A FORCE OF TWO-PLUS BATTALIONS THAT WOULD, A PORTION OF A CAMP AT A TIME: PROVIDE SECURITY FOR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS; ESTABLISH SCREENING PROCEDURES TO KEEP WEAPONS OUT OF SECURE AREAS; AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THOSE REFUGEES WHO WISH TO RETURN HOME. AFTER VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE IS COMPLETE, THE "BUBBLE" WOULD MOVE TO ANOTHER CAMP, LEAVING BEHIND A LOCAL SECURITY FORCE. THE SYG ESTIMATES A FORCE REQUIREMENT OF 3,000 FOR 24-30 MONTHS; AN ADDITIONAL 2,000 TROOPS COULD REDUCE THE TIME REQUIRED BY 10 MONTHS.

8. (C) IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE UN IS NOT/NOT LOOKING FOR A PATCHWORK COLLECTION OF TROOPS TO TRAIN, EQUIP, AND MOLD INTO AN EFFECTIVE FORCE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS ONE BATTALION, WELL EQUIPPED AND WELL-TRAINED, FROM EACH OF TWO OR THREE COUNTRIES.

9. (U) ON NOVEMBER 30, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUED A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT REQUESTING THE SYG TO EXPLORE ALL

UNCLASSIFIED

POSSIBLE MEANS TO RESOLVE THE GROWING PROBLEMS IN THE CAMPS. AMONG THE OPTIONS HE WAS REQUESTED TO CONSIDER WAS THE OPTION (A) THAT HE HAD RECOMMENDED.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 323818 060046Z

10. (C) EARLIER, UN CONTACTS HAD INFORMED USUN THAT THEY CONDUCTED SOME INFORMAL SOUNDINGS OF POTENTIAL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS (REFTEL), WITHOUT MUCH SUCCESS. IMMEDIATELY UPON ISSUANCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, HOWEVER, THE SECRETARIAT FACED EXPLORATORY REQUESTS TO FIFTY-SEVEN GOVERNMENTS OF POTENTIAL TROOP-CONTRIBUTING NATIONS. THE UN SUGGESTS THAT APPROACHES BY THE U.S. WOULD BE HELPFUL IN PERSUADING COUNTRIES TO JOIN THE NEW OPERATION. EMBASSIES ARE REQUESTED TO USE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL, ENCOURAGING HOST GOVERNMENTS TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO UN REQUESTS FOR TROOPS AND ASCERTAINING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DO SO. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS ARE NOTED BELOW.

11. (C) FOR RABAT: WE ARE MINDFUL OF THE GOM'S RESPONSE TO OUR EARLIER APPROACH ON SENDING TROOPS TO UNAMIR II. REQUEST EMBASSY DELIVER GENERAL AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS BELOW IF/IF YOU FEEL THERE WOULD BE SOME GOM RECEPTIVITY TO THE PROSPECT OF PARTICIPATING IN THIS OPERATION.

12. (U) BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

FOR ALL:

O IN HIS NOVEMBER 18 REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE SECRETARY GENERAL RECOMMENDED THAT A NEW PEACEKEEPING OPERATION BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN EASTERN ZAIRE.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 323818 060046Z

O IN THE NOVEMBER 30 SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS REQUESTED TO EXPLORE ALL MEANS OF RESOLVING THIS SITUATION, INCLUDING THE RECOMMENDED NEW PEACEKEEPING OPERATION.

O BEFORE THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASKS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO AUTHORIZE SUCH A MISSION, HOWEVER, HE IS CANVASSING POTENTIAL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO ENSURE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ASSEMBLE QUICKLY THE NECESSARY FORCES TO CARRY OUT THE MISSION.

O ON NOVEMBER 30, THE UN SECRETARIAT TRANSMITTED EXPLORATORY REQUESTS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF NUMEROUS POTENTIAL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, INCLUDING POSSIBLY YOUR GOVERNMENT.

O WE ENCOURAGE YOUR GOVERNMENT TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO AN APPROACH BY THE UN. WE BELIEVE THAT YOU COULD MAKE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO HELPING RWANDA RETURN TO A MORE STABLE CONDITION AND AVOID A FURTHER ROUND OF BLOODSHED.

O THE LONGER THE ESTIMATED 1.2 MILLION RWANDAN REFUGEES REMAIN IN ZAIRE, THE MORE LIKELY IT IS THAT THERE WILL BE A RETURN TO CIVIL WAR IN THAT COUNTRY. AT A MINIMUM, THE REFUGEES WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR FOOD AND SHELTER FOR YEARS TO COME.

O THE NEW OPERATION WOULD HAVE A SEPARATE MANDATE AND BUDGET FROM UNAMIR, BUT WOULD REPORT TO UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER GENERAL TOUSIGNANT AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (SRSG) SHAHARYAR KHAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 323818 060046Z

O THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS LOOKING FOR TWO WELL-TRAINED AND WELL-EQUIPPED MECHANIZED BATTALIONS AND ONE MOTORIZED BATTALION TO SPEARHEAD AN OPERATION IN THE CAMPS NORTH OF LAKE KIVU. EACH BATTALION WOULD ESTABLISH SECURE AREAS

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHIN LARGE CAMP SITES, PROVIDING SAFE CONDITIONS FOR THE REFUGEES IN THOSE AREAS.

UNCLASSIFIED

O THE FORCE WOULD ESTABLISH SCREENING PROCEDURES TO KEEP WEAPONS OUT OF THE SECURE AREAS, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE INTENSIFIED WITHIN THE SECURE AREAS. THE AIM DURING THIS FIRST PHASE WOULD BE TO CREATE

CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO THE VOLUNTARY RETURN HOME OF AS MANY REFUGEES AS POSSIBLE FROM EACH SECURE AREA.

O WITHIN EACH SECURE AREA, LOCAL SECURITY UNITS WOULD BE FORMED AND TRAINED TO TAKE OVER THE SECURITY FUNCTIONS BEING PERFORMED BY THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE WHEN REASONABLY SECURE CONDITIONS WERE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN CREATED. THE LOCAL UNITS MIGHT BE RECRUITED FROM SPECIALLY-VETTED MEMBERS OF THE ZAIRE SECURITY FORCES AND GENDARMERIE OF THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. THESE LOCAL SECURITY FORCES WOULD BE SUPERVISED BY UN ELEMENTS.

O IN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE OPERATION, LIGHTLY-EQUIPPED MOTORIZED UNITS WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN THE AREAS RENDERED SECURE DURING THE FIRST PHASE. THEIR MAIN TASKS WOULD BE TO ESCORT REFUGEES TO THE RWANDAN BORDER AND IN THE MEANTIME, TO ENSURE THAT CONDITIONS IN THE CAMP REMAIN SECURE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 323818 060046Z

O THE CAMPS WOULD THEN BE CLOSED (OR REDUCED AND CONSOLIDATED) AS THE REFUGEES RETURNED HOME.

O THE SECRETARY GENERAL ESTIMATES THAT A FORCE OF 3,000 WOULD BE REQUIRED AND WOULD TAKE 24-30 MONTHS TO COMPLETE THE OPERATION. AN ADDITIONAL 2,000 SOLDIERS, STARTING SOUTH OF LAKE KIVU, COULD REDUCE THE TIME REQUIRED BY 10 MONTHS.

O THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS ALSO SEEKING A SELF-CONTAINED MOBILE TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS UNIT AND A LOGISTICS SUPPORT UNIT, THE LATTER TO INCLUDE MAINTENANCE, LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORT ELEMENTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

O AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL NOTES IN HIS REPORT, THERE IS THE POTENTIAL THAT ELEMENTS WITHIN THE CAMP, FEARING THAT THIS MISSION WILL DILUTE THEIR POWER BASE, WILL OBJECT TO THE RETURN HOME OF LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES. BANDITRY AND GENERAL LAWLESSNESS HAVE ALSO BEEN A PROBLEM.

UNCLASSIFIED

O THUS, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE AUTHORIZED UNDER CHAPTER VI OF THE CHARTER AND WITH THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT (SIC) OF ZAIRE, THE FORCE WILL NEED TO HAVE ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND TO HAVE THE EQUIPMENT TO PROTECT ITSELF AND THE REFUGEES IT IS ESCORTING TO RWANDA.

O WE KNOW THAT THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY OPERATION. BUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS DONE A GREAT DEAL TO RELIEVE THE SUFFERING OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION AND TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 323818 060046Z  
BREAK THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE.

O THIS OPERATION CANNOT OPERATE IN ISOLATION. WE ARE WORKING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO MOVE THE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS FORWARD AND TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF REBUILDING THEIR COUNTRY, BASED ON THE RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF ALL RWANDAN CITIZENS.

O WE HOPE THAT IF THE UN, SUBJECT TO AUTHORIZATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, APPROACHES YOUR GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE PERSONNEL FOR THIS MISSION, YOU WILL BE ABLE TO RESPOND POSITIVELY.

FOR STOCKHOLM AND THE HAGUE:

O WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE CIVILIAN POLICE FOR THIS OPERATION. MONITORING OF THE LOCAL SECURITY FORCES WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION.

FOR WARSAW:

UNCLASSIFIED

O WE APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT IN HAITI, AND RECOGNIZE THAT POLAND HAS ALREADY MADE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO RWANDA'S CAUSE. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION IN THE CAMPS IS GRAVE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT YOU COULD CONTRIBUTE THERE AS WELL BY OFFERING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS OPERATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OTTAWA, DUBLIN:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 323818 060046Z

O YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SPECIALIZED ELEMENTS IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF UNAMIR AND UNOSOM, AMONG OTHERS, WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE OPERATIONS OF THOSE MISSIONS. WE WOULD HOPE THAT YOU COULD MAKE A SIMILAR CONTRIBUTION TO A NEW OPERATION IN ZAIRE.

FOR BONN:

O WE ASK THAT GERMANY GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO PROVIDING SOLDIERS FOR A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS OF EASTERN ZAIRE. GERMANY HAS THE WELL-TRAINED AND WELL-EQUIPPED TROOPS WHICH COULD MAKE A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE IN THE SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION. GERMAN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND/OR A MEDICAL UNIT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY VALUABLE. WE ASSESS THE RISK AS RELATIVELY LOW AND THE POLITICAL BENEFIT AS CONSIDERABLE.

FOR RABAT:

O THE PERFORMANCE OF MOROCCAN TROOPS IN OTHER PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAS BEEN HIGHLY REGARDED. THEIR FRENCH LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES WOULD BE A VERY HELPFUL ASSET AS WELL IN DEALING WITH THE LOCAL POPULATIONS.

IF ASKED:

O THE UNITED STATES WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE LIFT AND POSSIBLY OTHER SUPPORT, ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS, IF REQUESTED BY THE U.N.

13. (C) FOR ISLAMABAD AND NEW DELHI: REFTEL REPORTS THAT  
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 12 STATE 323818 060046Z  
THE PAKISTANIS HAVE VOLUNTEERED FOR DUTY IN ZAIRE, AND  
THAT THE INDIANS HAVE SAID NO. GIVEN THE DIFFICULTIES OF  
MAKING ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES TO  
WORK IN UNOSOM AND THE CLOSE COORDINATION THAT WILL BE  
REQUIRED IN ZAIRE, IT PROBABLY WILL NOT BE FEASIBLE TO  
HAVE BOTH COUNTRIES PARTICIPATE IN THIS OPERATION.  
NEVERTHELESS, MISSIONS ARE REQUESTED TO ASCERTAIN THE  
FIRMNESS OF THE PAKISTANI OFFER AND WHETHER NEW DELHI  
WOULD BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO A HIGH LEVEL U.S. DEMARCHE.  
TARNOFF

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED